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1 Introduction
Universities face substantial pressure to use their funding in an efficient man-
ner as public and private agencies tend to provide financial resources based
on competitive funding. Besides, universities have become increasingly im-
portant as part of the national innovation system. Consequently, the interest
to measure and evaluate university productivity has increased substantially
by both the university management and the politics. But there are few ar-
ticles analyzing the impact of different funding resources on productivity of
universities. However, both the theoretical and empirical findings are am-
biguous, indicating that further research in this area is required to allow
policymakers to make evidence-based decisions (see e.g. Van der Ploeg and
Veugelers, 2008).
Our paper attempts to analyse the effects of competitive funding on uni-
versity production. Thereby, we focus on the production frontier, which is
build by the best performing universities, whereas deviations below from
such a ‘best practice frontier’ implies inefficient production. The question
arises, are the effects of competitive funding on the production frontier and
on the inefficiency the same? Based on the framework of principal-agent-
theory with the donor of third-party funds as the principal and researchers
as the agents (see e.g. Kivisto¨, 2005), we consider different channels through
which third-party funding might influence a university’s production. To our
best knowledge, there is no study which explicitly estimates the differential
effects of third-party resources. Indeed, as our study is based on stochastic
frontier analyses, enables us to disentangle the effects, i.g. how third-party
funding especially influence both the production frontier and the inefficiency.
We extend the existing literature by analysing the impact of three com-
petitive funding types on the university production frontier and the efficiency
using a simultaneous two-stage approach for the analyses. In particular, this
paper develops a theoretical framework for the impact of competitive univer-
sity funding, suggesting that the direction of the effect might differ between
the production frontier and efficiency. We chose the following three dif-
ferent funding resources—tuition fees, public international funds and private
funds—as they belong to the main financial sources beside the university core
budget. Moreover, we explicitly account for the multi-input, multi-output
production process of higher education while applying a distance function
approach. In addition, our estimations are based on a rich micro-level panel
data set covering the period of 1994-2006 across eight European countries.
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The panel structure of the data further enables us to tackle unobserved het-
erogeneity and reverse causality while introducing several control variables
in our analyses.
Supporting our predictions, the results show that tuition fees have a posi-
tive impact on the production frontier, but a negative on university efficiency.
Conversely, public international funds reduce the production frontier, but in-
crease efficiency. The results for private funds are ambiguous as they indicate
an inverse u-shaped effect on both the production frontier and efficiency. Our
findings suggest that introducing competition in the university sector entails
a trade-off that should be taken into account by politicians.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the theoret-
ical framework our analyses are based on. The estimation approach along
with the specifications of the applied models are introduced in Section 3 and
Section 4. Section 5 provides information on the data used for the analy-
ses. Estimation results of the empirical analyses are presented in Section 6
followed by conclusions in Section 7.
2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Re-
search
In the following section we develop a theoretical framework regarding the pro-
duction frontier and efficiency of universities; in other words, the difference
between the impact on university’s productivity of the best and the average
university. It is based on the principal-agent framework with the donor of
third-party funding as the principal and researchers as the agents (see e.g.
Kivisto¨, 2005). The principal-agent problem in science (Van der Meulen,
1998) reflects a situation in which the government or a governmental private
or agency is attempting to increase public research funding programs follow-
ing the societal targets to enhance the national innovation system. However,
as it does not come with the appropriate know-how and respective human
resources to conduct the target, it needs to delegate the actual implemen-
tation of research to specialized organizations such as universities (Auranen
and Nieminen, 2010). Given different utility functions between the donor of
third-party funding and the agent, information asymmetries between both ac-
tors arise. Hence, the principal needs both appropriate selection and control
mechanisms, which ensure that the principal’s targets are fulfilled. Based
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on that, we consider different channels through which third-party funding
might influence a university’s production. We differentiate between the ad-
ministration effect, the missallocation effect, the discipline and the sorting
effect. They are introduced in more detail as the following.
The most apparent channel may be due to the administrative effort third-
party funding induces; i.e. the acquisition of external funds requires the in-
vestment of time and money by the researchers—see e.g., the need to follow
formal requirements when applying for third-party funding and to submit-
ting interim and final reports. Therefore, as Van der Meulen (1998) points
out, such monitoring systems bring additional costs, and self-reporting by
the agents is unreliable without further incentives. We call this channel
administration effect and assume that it results in a decrease of the pro-
duction frontier due to costs of monitoring the agent’s behaviour. In other
words, since all universities apply for third-party funding—regardless of the
extent of third-party acquisition—, these cost reduce the productivity of all
universities equally, and hence only the frontier, but not efficiency is af-
fected. In a comparative interview-based study of experimental physicists
working at Australian and German universities Laudel (2006) shows that
the researcher’s criteria for selecting funding agencies indeed refer to the ef-
fort caused by writing a grant application and the further report procedures,
and a rough success rate for getting external funds. For example, funding
from the European Union was perceived as being extremely bureaucratic
concerning application and reporting procedures, though a very low success
rate.
The second channel, which we call the misallocation effect, arises due to
the difference in the utility functions of the principal and the agent. In order
to control the agents’ behavior the principal has an interest to set respective
restrictions concerning the use of third-party funds. However, these restric-
tions are based on incomplete information the principal faces and hence may
cause behavioral changes and a suboptimal outcome. Finally, the misspeci-
fied restrictions will lead to a decrease of the university’s production frontier
as financial resources are inappropriately allocated by the principal (see e.g.
Schiller and Liefner, 2006). Thereby, it is the same argument as for the ad-
ministration effect, i.g. since all universities apply for third-party funding the
costs due to the misallocation effect reduce the productivity of all universities
equally, and hence only the frontier, but not efficiency is affected. Especially,
since introducing instruments according to implement the concept of New
Public Management (NPM) in the public sector, there are several studies that
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Figure 1: Administration and misallocation effect on production frontier
analyses the relationship of restrictions and university production. For exam-
ple, Schubert (2009) finds a significant relationship between the introduction
of NPM government schemes and productivity. Further empirical evidence
is given by findings of Aghion et al. (2009), who present macroeconomic
evidence for the misallocation effect by showing that autonomy and produc-
tivity are positively related. Kempkes and Pohl (2008) also find evidence for
the misallocation effect in their examination of German universities by show-
ing that independence increases university efficiency. Moreover, Mensah and
Werner (2003) and Kuo and Ho (2007) study funding restrictions directly.
Their findings show a negative correlation between (financial)autonomy and
efficiency, which can be interpreted as evidence for the misallocation effect.
To illustrate the administration and missallocation effect, which both to
be assumed to influence university’s production frontier in the same direc-
tion, Figure 1 displays the relationship graphically. The vertical axis shows
the aggregated vector of university output, (qi), i.g. at least teaching and
research measured e.g., by the number students or graduates and the number
of publications, and the horizontal axis shows an aggregated input vector,
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(xi), measured in monetary terms such as operating expenses or the number
of personnel based on full-time-equivalents. P (x, q) shows the production
frontier, and therewith represents the input-output-combinations of the best
performing universities. For example, a university that produces at point A
uses inputs best possible to produce outputs. Hence, it is identified as fully
efficient and operates on the production frontier. By contrast, a university
that produces at point B uses an input-output-combination that implies po-
tential improvements to increase efficiency. Here, the inefficiency is displayed
by the distance between B to the frontier. The misallocation and administra-
tion effect can be shown by shifting the production frontier below, P ′(x, q).
We particularly assume that misspecified restrictions set by the principal and
costs due to monitoring the agent’s behavior have an negative impact on the
production of universities. While holding all other factors constant a decrease
of the production frontier does not affect the (in)efficiency of point A and
B, i.g. A is identified as best performing university as before and operates
on the frontier, while B operates below the frontier implying a substantial
potential to improve its efficiency.
Based on the same information asymmetry as the misallocation effect
causes, there might also be a positive impact of restricting external funds
due to moral hazard. The restrictions on the employment of provided re-
sources might decrease the ability of the agent to pursue his own goals at
the expense of the donor. It will lead to using funds in an inefficient way
(see e.g. Niskanen, 1971, 1975). This third channel, which we call discipline
effect, results in an increase of efficient production. Van der Meulen (1998)
shows, for instance, possibilities the principal has to induce competition for
third-party funding e.g., peer review procedures, targeted funding or perfor-
mance measures. Furthermore, if the allocation of funding resources related
to the output, Auranen and Nieminen (2010) argue, it creates a general in-
centive for all the actors to achieve better results in order to become more
competitive. Hence, we assume that an increasing competition of funding
sources might decrease inefficiency. Empirical findings for such a discipline
effect are provided by for instance Butler (2003), whose study shows that the
introduction of competitive funding based on output counts has increased
the share of Australia’s ISI publications despite declining resources, indicat-
ing the presence of a disciplining effect. Again, the findings of Cherchye
and Abeele (2005) find a positive correlation between the share of scientific
research grants and efficiency, but a negative effect of contract research funds.
The respective relationship is shown graphically in Figure 2. As a univer-
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Figure 2: Discipline effect on efficiency
sity like at point B is to oblige to follow the restrictions on the use of compet-
itive third-party funds the rising competition of funding sources might force
B to reduce inefficient production. As a result, the distance between B′, new
input-output-combination, and the production frontier is decreased. Note,
that a university at point A is assumed to produce as best practice univer-
sity at the frontier. In other words it already competes for financial resources
against other higher education institutions on the national and international
market. Though, one might consider that competition of third-party funding
might also lead to increased efficiency of those universities that produces on
the frontier, we assume—if at all— only a small but in general no substantial
change in the efficiency level (not displayed in Figure 2).
Finally, there might also be a forth effect due to a sorting of personnel
and students into universities according productivity. In particular, Coupe´
et al. (2003), who investigated incentive effects at US economics departments
find such a sorting effect for scientific personnel. Their results suggest that
the more productive professors will be allocated with the more productive
universities during their careers. The same is true for students as top stu-
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Figure 3: Sorting effect
dents are sorted to universities with best reputations, the most prestige, and
the greatest past success of matriculating high potential students (Cook and
Frank, 1993)—whereas e.g., a high ranking position usually serves as perfor-
mance signal. The empirical results by Black and Smith (2004) support this
argument. They found out that higher ability students disproportionately
attend higher quality colleges. Based on these findings, we assume that the
productivity of the best universities increases but decreases for the worst. In
particular, the first are able to attract and hence select high ability person-
nel and students. Following this kind of downward spiral universities, which
operate below the frontier, have the drawback that they can now select only
from the pool of the remaining personnel and students. Due to the selection
of high potentials in favor of the best performing universities, the sorting
effect will further induce a rising spread between universities that operate
efficiently and inefficiently, respectively.
This relationship is displayed in Figure 3 where the production frontier
P (x, q)—again built by the best performing universities like at point A—is
shifted outwards. In addition the inefficiency of a university in point B rises
as the distance to the frontier increases. Given only a small number of uni-
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versities that built the best practice frontier, the majority of universities
operates below the frontier. Therefore, we assume that the average efficiency
decreases because of the increasing variation of best and worst performing
universities.
The hypotheses following the theoretical framework we developed for our
analyses in order to specify the impact of third-party funding on the univer-
sities’ production frontier and efficiency are summarized in Table 1:
int. public and private funds Dis Mis Adm Sort Total
production frontier 0 - - + ?
efficiency + 0 0 - ?
tuition fees Dis Mis Adm Sort Total
production frontier 0 0 0 + +
efficiency + 0 0 - ?
Table 1: Summary of third-party effects on production frontier and efficiency
In particular, for international public and private funds we assume that a
negative effect on the production frontier might be caused by a misallocation
and/or an administrative effect, and a positive effect due to sorting effect.
By contrast, following the theoretical framework we developed the sorting
effect might have a positive impact on the spread between best and worst
performing universities, and hence might result in a decrease of the average
efficiency over all universities. However, we suggest a positive effect of inter-
national and private funds on efficiency arisen by an increasing competition
that discipline to efficient production. For tuition fees, we predict also a pos-
itive effect on the efficiency due to the discipline effect, but a negative one
caused by the sorting effect. Again, there might also be a positive impact
on the production frontier due to the sorting effect. But no administrative
effect is apparent because the monitoring costs are covered by the parents,
and the voting by feet methodology does not create a misallocation effect.
3 Methodology and estimation approach
In order to analyze the effect of competitive funding on higher education
production, this study is based on a distance function approach proposed by
Shephard (1953, 1970) using a parametric efficiency measure called stochas-
tic frontier analyses (SFA). In contrast to other representations, the distance
8
function approach allows us to model a production process of multiple-inputs
and multiple-outputs which is the case for higher education production with-
out any underlying assumptions on specific behavioral objectives (e.g. cost
minimization or profit maximization). Instead, by modeling the distance
from the production frontier as a function of the vector of inputs used, x,
and the level of outputs produced, q, giving a feasible production set allows
us to identify ‘best practice’ production.
With respect to the characteristics of the production technology, a dis-
tance function may be specified with either an input orientation or an output
orientation depending on the assumption whether inputs or outputs are de-
termined by exogenous factors. While an input oriented distance function
aims at identifying how much the input vector may be proportionally con-
tracted holding the output vector fixed, considering an output oriented dis-
tance function means searching for the largest proportional expansion of the
output vector given a fixed input vector. Following Abbott and Doucouliagos
(2009), we utilize an output distance function. In other words, universities
are modeled as output maximizing institutions, an assumption that appears
reasonable as inputs of public higher education institutions are mostly de-
cided upon by politicians.
Considering an output oriented production technology the distance func-
tion provides information on how much the output vector can be proportion-
ally increased holding the input vector fixed. Following Coelli et al. (2005),
the output distance function is defined on the output set, P (x), as:
Do(x, q) = min {θ : (q/θ) ∈ P (x)} (1)
where P (x) represents the set of all non-negative input vectors
x = (x1, ..., xK) ∈ RK+ that can produce the non-negative output vector
q = (q1, ..., qM) ∈ RM+ . Then, the distance from the firm’s output set P (x) to
the production frontier is given by Do(x, q). Fa¨re and Primont (1995) showed
that Do(x, q) holds the properties of non-decreasing, positively linearly ho-
mogeneity and convexity in q, and increasing in x. θ is the scalar distance
by which the output vector can be deflated (see e.g. Coelli, 2000) and can
be interpreted as the level of efficiency. If q ∈ P (x), then Do(x, q) = θ ≤ 1
which means that the distance function, Do(x, q), will take a value which is
less than or equal to one if the output vector, q, is an element of the feasible
production set, P (x). In particular, if the output vector q is located on the
outer boundary of the output set— the production frontier—, firms are iden-
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tified as being fully efficient, while values less than one belong to inefficient
output vectors below the production frontier.
Based on the distance function approach we employ stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) to estimate how competitive funding may affect universities’
production frontier and efficiency. The theory of stochastic frontier pro-
duction functions was originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) as well
as Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Unlike non-parametric efficiency
measures such as data envelopment analyses (DEA), which lack common
statistical properties because the production frontier of ‘best practice’ is ob-
tained by linear programming and therewith all deviations from the frontier
are assumed to be the result of technical inefficiency, SFA is a parametric
efficiency measure. That means it has the benefit that it accommodates to
statistical noise. In particular, the production function is estimated with the
underlying assumption of a composed error term,  = ν − u. For a single
output case the production frontier is formulated as:
qi = β
′xi + i, where i = νi − ui
where q is the output and x a vector of the inputs of firm i. In the composed
error term (), the two-sided error components, νi, account for statistical
noise typically due to measurement errors and is normally distributed with
zero mean and constant variance, i.i.d.(νi N [0, σ
2
ν ])]. They are denoted to
as the ‘two-sided’ error terms as they are symmetrically distributed around
the ‘true’ frontier. Instead, the ui components, assumed to be independently
distributed of νi, are non-negative random error terms, ui ≥ 0, and associated
with technical inefficiency. As they are truncated below by the frontier itself,
they are often referred to as the ‘one-sided’ error terms. There are several
assumptions how the ui components are distributed, whereat the choice of
the distributional specification is a matter of computational issues as well as
theoretical considerations (see e.g. Coelli et al., 2005).1
Due to the parametric nature of stochastic distance functions, it is neces-
sary to determine the relationship between inputs and outputs by specifying
the functional form for the underlying production technology, and it requires
assumptions concerning the distribution of the error and inefficiency term.
However, adopting a translog functional form reduces the first problem sub-
stantially. Unlike a Cobb-Douglas function, which assumes for all firms elas-
1see for more information on distributional specification (see e.g. Coelli et al., 2005;
Fried et al., 2008).
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ticities of production and scale properties to be constant and the elasticity of
substitution to be equal to unity, the translog function does not impose such
restrictives. Instead, the translog function provides a second order approxi-
mation of the true function as cross-terms are included in the log-linear form.
Therewith, it is preferable to a Cobb-Douglas function because it represents
a relatively flexible functional form (Coelli et al., 2005). To ensure that the
first-order translog parameters can be directly interpreted as the production
elasticities at the sample median firm, all parameters are divided by its me-
dian value, thereby this does not change the results (see e.g. Coelli et al.,
2005). The translog output distance function for K(k = 1, ..., K) inputs and
M(m = 1, ...,M) outputs can be written for panel data as:
lnDOit = α0 +
M∑
m=1
αmlnqmit +
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmnlnqmit ∗ lnqnit
+
K∑
k=1
βklnxkit +
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkllnxkit ∗ lnxlit
+
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
ηkmlnqkit ∗ lnxmit +
S∑
s=1
γszsit
(3)
where lnDOi,t is the output distance term with the subscript i = 1, ..., I for
the ith-firm in year t = 1, ..., T . xkit and qmit denote the input and output
quantity, respectively. zsit(z = 1, ..., S) reflects a vector of observable firm-
specific factors expected to have an impact on the production technology;
and α, β, η, and γ are unknown parameters to be estimated.
In order to ensure the theoretical conditions of symmetry and linear ho-
mogeneity of degree one in outputs, it is necessary to impose some restrictions
that must be hold by the output distance function (see e.g. Coelli and Perel-
man, 2000): For symmetry it is required αmn = αnm form,n = 1, 2, ...,M and
βkl = βlk for k, l = 1, 2, ..., K. Linear homogeneity in degree one in outputs is
given if
∑M
m=1 αm = 1,
∑M
n=1 αmn = 0 for m = 1, 2, ...,M and
∑M
m=1 βmk = 0
for k, l = 1, 2, ..., K. Following Lovell et al. (1994) the homogeneity restric-
tions can be imposed through normalizing the distance term and the outputs
by choosing arbitrarily one of the outputs such as qM .
2 Hence, the depen-
dent variable in Equation 3 becomes lnDOit/qMit which can be rewritten as
2The symmetry restrictions are done during estimation.
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ln(DOit ) − ln(qMit). It enables us to express the formulation as a standard
production frontier since the distance term, ln(DOit ), can be transfered to the
right-hand side of Equation 3. Replacing the negative log of the distance
term with the inefficiency term, as they are equivalent, (i.g. −lnD = −u),
yields the common form of a stochastic frontier estimation:
lnqMit = α0 +
M−1∑
m=1
αmlnq
∗
mit +
1
2
M−1∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmnlnq
∗
mit ∗ lnq∗nit
+
K∑
k=1
βklnxkit +
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkllnxkit ∗ lnxlit
+
K∑
k=1
M−1∑
m=1
ηkmlnxmit ∗ lnq∗mit +
S∑
s=1
γszsit + νit − uit
(4)
where summations over m implies summing only the M − 1 outputs not
used for normalization, since q∗mit = (qmit/qMit) thus q
∗
mit = 1.
3 Due to
the fact that it is more consistent with the expected signs of parameters
in conventional production frontiers, we follow studies that use ln(qMit) as
dependent variable instead of −ln(qMit) (see e.g., Paul et al., 2000; Pascoe,
2010; Abbott and Doucouliagos, 2009).4
4 Modeling approach
In order to estimate the effect of competitive funding on the universities’ pro-
duction frontier and efficiency our analyses are based on a simultaneous SFA
approach, in which the production model and the technical inefficiency model
are jointly estimated. In particular, the impact of exogeneous determinants
on the production frontier and on the inefficiency term are estimated simul-
taneously. Therewith, we consider the criticism of the two-stage approach
used in the past which lacks the fact that the second stage analysis of sys-
tematic determinants of the inefficiency effects contradicts the assumption of
3In the single output case, where M = 1 is used in the production process, the output
distance function will be equivalent to a standard output translog production function.
4Note that for estimation purposes, the negative sign on the dependent variable can be
ignored, but it makes the interpretation of the estimated coefficients easier (Paul et al.,
2000).
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an identical distribution of these effects that is made in the first stage, when
the stochastic frontier is estimated.
Following the framework developed in Section 2, we firstly include the
budget shares financed by tuition fees, international public funds, and pri-
vate funds in the stochastic output distance function. Using the budget share
variables as explanatory variables in the distance function directly suggests
the interpretation that funding competition affects the production frontier
itself. Disregard the translog output distance function formulation but fol-
lowing the stochastic frontier approach we can easily write:
qMit = α0 + α
′qit + β′xit + γsBSHAit + νit − uit (5)
where qMit serves as normalizing output and is used as dependent variable,
α′qit contains the vector of normalized outputs and β′xit reflects the pro-
duction technology of the i-th university in time, t. The Z-variables from
Equation 4 are specified by introducing the vector BSHAit, which covers the
budget shares of the third-party variables which are assumed to influence the
university production frontier. Again, νit and uit are the two components of
the disturbance error term, it.
Arguably, university management controls the shares of third-party fund-
ing by introducing corresponding incentives, implying that the funding shares
influence efficiency but not the production frontier. In this case the proper
econometric strategy consists of modeling efficiency as a function of the fund-
ing shares, but refrain from including them in the output distance function
directly (see e.g. Cherchye and Abeele, 2005). However, to the extent that
competition pressures universities at the boundary to increase their effort, the
estimated production frontier might shift as well. Examples for the treatment
of funding structure as exogenous are Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) and Carayol
and Matt (2006).
For our analyses, we therefore assume that the funding shares influence
both the production frontier and the inefficiency of universities. By allowing
the inefficiency term, uit, to be a function of the third-party variables the
inefficiency equation can then be written as:
qMit = α0 + α
′qit + β′xit + γsBSHAit + νit − uit(BSHAit) (6)
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whereas for our analyses uit is to be assumed to follow a half-normal distri-
bution, i.i.d. (uit N
+[0, σ2u])].
5
Furthermore, in order to allow the inefficiency not to be homogeneous
across individuals and time, quite a few models are proposed recently which
incorporate several forms of heterogeneity in the inefficiency model.6 In par-
ticular, traditional SFA models suggest that firms operate under the same
production technology and that the inefficiency distribution across individu-
als and time are homogeneous; hence, firms are to be assumed only differing
by the random noise term.
In order to account for exogeneous determinants affecting the inefficiency
one may e.g. follow Battese and Coelli (1995) who assumed for the ineffi-
ciency model that the mean of the inefficiency term, µuit, is a linear func-
tion of firm-specific attributes, zit, which directly affect technical inefficiency,
i.i.d.(uit N
+[µit, σ
2
u]). However, we follow Caudil et al. (1995), who incorpo-
rated heterogeneity in the variance of uit, allowing for heteroscedasticity, an
assumption which is due to the SFA models proposed by Reifschnieder and
Stevenson (1991) and by Simar and van den Eeckhaut P. (1994).7 In partic-
ular, Caudil et al. (1995) analyzed, whether the variance of the inefficiency
term, uit, is constant over the whole sample or influenced by some of the ex-
planatory variables. They could show that the presence of heteroscedasticity
yields biased parameter estimates of the production frontier and firm-specific
inefficiency, i.g. the inefficiency term varies according to increasing inputs,
since firms with a high input- and output-capacity have some scope for vari-
ation, and therefore scope for inefficiency.
Consequently, for the inefficiency equation we use the variance of the
inefficiency term, uit, modelled as a function of the third-party variables
written as:
5A half-normal distribution—together with the exponential—is the most widely used
distribution to model inefficiency. Other distributional assumptions of ui are e.g., the
truncated normal or gamma distribution.
6Basically, they focus on a differentiation between heterogeneity in the production
model and heterogeneity in the inefficiency model, or a differentiation between observable
and unobservable heterogeneity (Greene, 2008).
7Reifschnieder and Stevenson (1991) developed (but does not implement) a model
in which the standard deviation parameter of inefficiency is a function of firm specific
conditions, while Simar and van den Eeckhaut P. (1994) formulate a model in which the
variance and the mean of inefficiency depends on a set of firm characteristics via a scale
transformation of the inefficiency term.
14
σu
2
it = ψ0 + δrBSHArit + ωit (7)
whereas BSHArit is the vector of the explanatory variables—the budget
shares financed by tuition fees public international funds and private funds—
and δr is a parameter vector to be estimated that captures the influence of
the explanatory determinants on the level of inefficiency. Given that the
inefficiency term is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution, a decrease
in the variance will lead to increments in the efficiency level; i.g. a posi-
tive (negative) coefficient estimate of δr indicates a negative (positive) effect
on the variance of technical efficiency. ωit refers to the standard normally
distributed error term. In this approach, the parameters for the production
frontier and for the inefficiency model are estimated jointly using the max-
imum likelihood technique (Caudil et al., 1995). Furthermore, the variance
and the mean of the inefficiency term have a linear relationship, i.e. if one
goes up, so does the other.
The above methodology captures our attempt to disentangle correlations
between third-party funding, the production frontier and efficiency. However,
there are a number of reasons why the observed correlation might not reflect
causality. An example includes the potential of reverse causality, i.e. the
possibility that third-party funding goes to efficient universities and not the
other way round. Unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. student and staff quality
causes identification problems as well. We attempt to exploit the panel data
structure to address these problems of identification. Notably, in order to ac-
count for country specific differences we include country dummies to tackle
unobserved heterogeneity at country level. We also incorporate country av-
erages to control on the one hand for reverse causality and on the other hand
for unobserved heterogeneity at university level assuming that third-party
funding is not affected by a single university, instead it is rather a political
decision process exogenously given. Finally, we have included lagged val-
ues of budget shares of two years to control for reverse causality, and year
dummies to account for differences over time.
5 Data issues and empirical model
The data used in this study stems from the Aquameth database, a European
project that has established an extensive data set which contains comparable
statistics at university-level across a large number of European countries. The
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data are unbalanced and covers a period from 1994 to 2006. Detailed infor-
mation on the Aquameth project and its database can be found in Bonaccorsi
and Daraio (2007) and Daraio et al. (2011).8
Due to the issue of data availability we use data of Finland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the UK four our analyses.9
We use information on enrolled Bachelor’s and Master’s students to capture
teaching output of the universities. The number of publications reflects the
output of research. Five labor categories serve as inputs; they are professors,
assistant professors, researchers, other administrative staff and finally tech-
nical and administrative staff. Note that despite all efforts, the definition of
input variables varies across countries. Most notably, not all countries report
full-time equivalent employment contracts. However, we follow Slipersaeter
et al. (2005) and use a mix of FTE and headcount data of the university per-
sonnel. Furthermore, the labor categories appear somewhat fuzzy as well.
Moreover, the data includes detailed information on financial resources
of each university; i.g. the shares of total budget financed by tuition fees,
international public funds and private funds. Again, the usefulness of these
variables varies substantially, where tuition fees present the largest problem.
Norway and Finland do not have any tuition fees and in the remaining coun-
tries, the process of raising fees is strongly regulated. As a consequence, there
is little variation over time. This feature collides with the fact that this study
utilizes the panel structure of the data to establish a credible identification
strategy. Both international public funds and private funds contain enough
variation over time to render the argument above irrelevant.
For our analyses we manipulate the data in a number of ways: First,
we interpolate all variables linearly and drop all observations with missing
values. We also exclude all observations where data on the budget shares
financed by international public grants or private funding are not available.
Furthermore, we eliminate observations for which all outputs are missing.
Finally, we replace outputs and inputs (and the budget share of tuition fees)
by 0.01 (0), thereby allow for specialization of universities. In addition, all
variables are normalized by the median.
The summary statistics of the variables is given in Table 2. Both the out-
puts, inputs as well as the budget shares cover a wide range of data values
8see http://www.prime-noe.org/aquameth.html
9As quality data of the universities in our sample are not available as much as needed
quality indicators could not be included in the analyses.
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with respect e.g., to country size (number of universities, number of students,
labor inputs) and the political system of tertiary education (introduction of
tuition fees, public and private budgets). Cross-correlations presented in Ta-
ble 7 given in the Appendix indicates that inputs and outputs are correlated
to some extent with each other.
Table 2: Summary statistics for variables of the output distance function
Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
q1* Publications 774 1043 1 6964
q2** Enrolled students 17935 20499 0 176154
x1* Professors and assistant professors 648 817 0 6080
x2* Other research staff 771 850 0 6295
x3* Technical and administrative staff 904 727 38 6677
bsha tuit* Budget share of tuition fees 0.1871 0.1101 0 0.7042
bsha pub int* Budget share of international public funds 0.0228 0.0230 0 0.5499
bsha priv* Budget share of private funds 0.0471 0.0639 0 0.4020
*enters in logs, normalized by median; **enters in logs, normalized by median and publications
Number of observations: 1711 (1994-2004)
The output distance function we use for our analyses has then the follow-
ing functional form:
lnQ1ijt = α0 + α1(ln(Q2ijt/Q1ijt)) +
1
2
α11(ln(Q2ijt/Q1ijt))
2
+β1lnX1ijt + β2lnX2ijt + +β3lnx3ijt
+
1
2
β11(lnX1ijt)
2 +
1
2
β22(lnX2ijt)
2 +
1
2
β33(lnX3ijt)
2
+β12lnX1ijt ∗ lnX2ijt + β13lnX1ijt ∗ lnX3ijt + β23lnX2ijt ∗ lnX3ijt
+η12lnX1ijt ∗ lnQ2ijt + η22lnX2ijt ∗ lnQ2ijt + η32lnX3ijt ∗ lnQ2ijt
+γ1BSHAtuitF ijt + γ2BSHApubintF ijt + γ3BSHAprivF ijt
+νijt + uijt +
C∑
c=1
δcControlcijt.
(8)
whereas the number of publications, Q1, of university i in country j in time
t is the dependent variable and serves as the normalizing output. The re-
maining output, i.g. the number of enrolled Bachelor and Master students
appears as explanatory variable normalized by publications, Q2/Q1. The la-
bor input variables are denoted by X1, X2, X3, and the external variables,
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BSHA, that reflect the budget shares financed by tuition fees, public interna-
tional funds and private funds are respectively displayed with the subscript
tuitF , pubintF , privF . νijt corresponds to the normally distributed error
term, and uijt refers to the inefficiency term. The vector of control variables,
Control, covers several dummy variables to tackle unobserved heterogeneity
and reverse causality in our analyses.
6 Results
Table 3 and Table 4 displays the results for the different model specifications
based on distance function analyses.10 All estimations refer to a simulta-
neous two-stage SFA, meaning the production model is jointly estimated
with the inefficiency model while assuming a half-normal distribution with
the variance of inefficiency as dependent variable. The four models differ
with respect to the inclusion of control variables; i.g. year dummies, country
dummies, lagged values of budget shares and country averages. Therewith,
it allows us to account for reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity at
country level and university-level.
First of all, focusing on the distance function estimates displayed in the
upper part of Table 3 our results show that the coefficients are well-behaving
in the sense that the first-order coefficients are statistically significant at the
1 percent level, and they have the expected signs across all four models. That
means the coefficient of the output variable is negative, while the coefficients
of the input variables are positive. However, the magnitude of the coefficients
differs slightly across the models, which is especially true when comparing
Model I, the basic model specification, with Model II, III, and IV in which
we account for reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. The smallest
difference among the models’ coefficients is given between Models II and III.
Our results regarding the effects of the budget shares on the produc-
tion frontier can be seen in the lower part of Table 3 which provides the
coefficients of third-party variables of the simultaneous first-stage stochas-
tic frontier estimations. For tuition fees the coefficients across nearly all
four models are positive and highly statistically significant, which indicates,
as we predicted, a kind of sorting effect. An increase in tuition fees rises
the production frontier of the best performing universities; it is shifted out-
wards. Also for international public funds we found a highly significant,
10Please find the results entire displayed in Table 5 given in the Appendix.
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Table 3: SFA and endogeneity: production model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
depvar: publ. (q1) Production Frontier
q2 (students) -0.615*** -0.705*** -0.704*** -0.618***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
q22 -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.081***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x1 (professors) 0.416*** 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.429***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x2 (other res. staff) 0.273*** 0.366*** 0.359*** 0.349***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x3 (tech. and adm. staff) 0.290*** 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.206***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x12 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.015 0.021
(0.000) (0.000) (0.527) (0.516)
x22 0.017*** 0.016** 0.004 0.015**
(0.004) (0.015) (0.485) (0.041)
x32 0.194*** -0.017 0.045 0.050
(0.000) (0.703) (0.487) (0.427)
x1x2 -0.046*** -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.082***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x1x3 -0.032** 0.043** 0.051** 0.041
(0.046) (0.023) (0.036) (0.223)
x2x3 -0.044** 0.042** 0.028 -0.016
(0.036) (0.024) (0.172) (0.471)
x1q2 -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.054*** -0.056**
(0.009) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011)
x2q2 -0.103*** -0.119*** -0.163*** -0.146***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x3q2 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.202*** 0.186***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha tuit 0.214*** 0.522*** 0.442*** 0.197*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.094)
bsha tuit2 0.119*** 0.201*** 0.160*** 0.105*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065)
bsha pub int -0.118*** -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.319***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha pub int2 -0.023** -0.016** -0.031*** -0.082
(0.021) (0.048) (0.001) (0.474)
bsha priv 0.057** 0.017 0.010 0.044
(0.011) (0.324) (0.606) (0.417)
bsha priv2 -0.027** -0.032*** -0.045*** 0.138
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182)
Constant 0.228*** -0.173*** -0.191** 0.351***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.040) (0.000)
N 1711 1711 1280 1297
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no yes yes no
Lagged values no no yes yes
Country averages no no no yes
p-values of coefficients in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significance
levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
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though, negative effect on the universities’ production frontier. This finding
gives strong evidence for an administration or misallocation effect—we can-
not differentiate them. The negative coefficients reported for international
public funds support our hypothesis that misspecified restrictions on the use
of third-party funds caused by incomplete information reduce the produc-
tion frontier. Furthermore, the results imply an administration effect mainly
caused by monitoring costs which reduce the production frontier. Especially
applying for international public funds, e.g. funds announced by the Euro-
pean Commission, is time-consuming. In other words, to follow the formal
requirements means that the researcher’s time available for teaching and re-
search activities decreases. Unlike tuition fees and international public funds,
the coefficients of the linear terms of the private funds estimates generally
show no significant values. Though, we find for almost all squared terms
highly significant coefficients, which would suggest an inverse u-shaped effect
of private funds on the production frontier of universities. However, these
results persist ambiguous.
Table 4: SFA and endogeneity: efficiency model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
depvar: σ2u Inefficiency Equation
bsha tuit 1.073*** 2.140*** 1.789*** 3.862***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
bsha tuit2 1.022*** 1.429*** 1.090*** 3.655***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha pub int -0.799*** -0.935*** -0.744*** -2.277***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
bsha pub int2 -0.189 -0.227 -0.404** -1.264***
(0.154) (0.112) (0.015) (0.003)
bsha priv 0.210 0.474* 0.448** 7.929***
(0.404) (0.066) (0.019) (0.000)
bsha priv2 -0.749*** -0.902*** -0.674*** -9.998***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.587*** -2.010*** -1.607*** -2.794***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1711 1711 1280 1297
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no yes yes no
Lagged values no no yes yes
Country averages no no no yes
p-values of coefficients in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote
significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
The effects on university efficiency is displayed in Table 4 which gives
the results of the simultaneous second stage coefficients estimated with the
variance of inefficiency as dependent variable. For tuition fees we find positive
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and statistically significant coefficients at the 1 percent level across all four
models. This findings imply that a rise of tuition fees increases inefficient vice
versa decreases efficient production of universities. Indeed, it gives evidence
for a sorting effect: Though the efficiency of the best performing universities
may increases, the spread of efficient and inefficient operating universities
rises. Consequently, the average efficiency across all universities decreases.
Furthermore, the results of the linear terms of international public funds
show highly significant negative coefficients implying a positive impact on
university efficiency. Following our predictions this result gives evidence for
a discipline effect as an increasing competition of funding sources increases
efficient production. One may suggest, e.g. that researchers only apply
for third-party funds, whom efforts will be reasonable compared to funding
requirements and project accomplishment. Finally, we also find ambiguous
effects of private funds on university efficiency as the squared term shows
highly significant negative estimates. Again, this result indicates an inverse
u-shaped effect on the efficiency.
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results, Table 6 in the Ap-
pendix reports six additional specifications, whereas Model IV repeat the
estimates of Model II in Table 3 and 4. The remaining columns show differ-
ent models which allows us to control for multicollinearity of variables and
estimation stages. In the first three columns the Model I-III include budget
shares financed by tuition fees, international public funds and private funds
separately in both frontier and inefficiency equation. In Model VI and VII all
budget shares types are included only in the frontier equation and only in the
inefficiency equation, respectively. Moreover, Model VII is run including all
budget shares types in both equations but adding their interactions with x
and q in the frontier equation. We find that our results remain qualitatively
robust to these variations in the model specification.
7 Conclusion
In our study we estimated the impact of competitive university funding, sug-
gesting that the direction of the effect might differ between the production
frontier and efficiency. We tested the models predictions using an unbalanced
panel data set at micro-level across 8 European countries to estimate a si-
multaneous two-stage SFA. Our analyses show mixed results for the effect
of third-party funding on university production. For tuition fees we found a
21
positive impact on the production frontier, but a negative one on efficiency
which supports a kind of sorting effect. For international public funds we
find strong evidence for the administrative effect as the estimates correlate
negatively with the production frontier. Moreover, our findings give evidence
for a misallocation effect and a discipline effect which is consistent with the
hypotheses, that competitive funding reduces the frontier due to monitoring
costs, but increases competition and therefore decreases inefficiency. The
results for private funds are ambiguous as indicated by an inverse u-shaped
effect on both the production frontier and efficiency. Our results suggest
that introducing competition in the university sector entails a trade-off that
should be taken into account by politicians.
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Appendix
Table 5: SFA and Endogeneity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Production Frontier: depvar: publ. (q1)
q2 (students) -0.615*** -0.705*** -0.704*** -0.618***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
q22 -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.081***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x1 (professors) 0.416*** 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.429***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x2 (other res. staff) 0.273*** 0.366*** 0.359*** 0.349***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x3 (tech. and adm. staff) 0.290*** 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.206***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x12 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.015 0.021
(0.000) (0.000) (0.527) (0.516)
x22 0.017*** 0.016** 0.004 0.015**
(0.004) (0.015) (0.485) (0.041)
x32 0.194*** -0.017 0.045 0.050
(0.000) (0.703) (0.487) (0.427)
x1x2 -0.046*** -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.082***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x1x3 -0.032** 0.043** 0.051** 0.041
(0.046) (0.023) (0.036) (0.223)
x2x3 -0.044** 0.042** 0.028 -0.016
(0.036) (0.024) (0.172) (0.471)
x1q2 -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.054*** -0.056**
(0.009) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011)
x2q2 -0.103*** -0.119*** -0.163*** -0.146***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x3q2 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.202*** 0.186***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha tuit 0.214*** 0.522*** 0.442*** 0.197*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.094)
bsha tuit2 0.119*** 0.201*** 0.160*** 0.105*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065)
bsha pub int -0.118*** -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.319***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha pub int2 -0.023** -0.016** -0.031*** -0.082
(0.021) (0.048) (0.001) (0.474)
bsha priv 0.057** 0.017 0.010 0.044
(0.011) (0.324) (0.606) (0.417)
bsha priv2 -0.027** -0.032*** -0.045*** 0.138
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182)
Constant 0.228*** -0.173*** -0.191** 0.351***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.040) (0.000)
Inefficiency Equation: depvar: σ2u
bsha tuit 1.073*** 2.140*** 1.789*** 3.862***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
bsha tuit2 1.022*** 1.429*** 1.090*** 3.655***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha pub int -0.799*** -0.935*** -0.744*** -2.277***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
bsha pub int2 -0.189 -0.227 -0.404** -1.264***
(0.154) (0.112) (0.015) (0.003)
bsha priv 0.210 0.474* 0.448** 7.929***
(0.404) (0.066) (0.019) (0.000)
bsha priv2 -0.749*** -0.902*** -0.674*** -9.998***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.587*** -2.010*** -1.607*** -2.794***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1711 1711 1280 1297
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no yes yes no
Lagged values no no yes yes
Country averages no no no yes
p-values of coefficients in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significance levels
of 10%, 5% and 1%. All estimations refer to a simultaneous two-stage SFA,
the first stage, the production function estimation, and in the second stage
with the inefficiency estimation assuming a half-normal distribution with the
variance of inefficiency as dependent variable. Model 1: Basic estimation,
Model 2: Including country dummies, Model 3: Including country dummies
and lagging budget shares by two years, Model 4: Using country averages of
budget shares lagged by two years.
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Table 6: SFA and Multicollinearity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Production Frontier: depvar: publ. (q1)
q2 -0.664*** -0.639*** -0.624*** -0.705*** -0.606*** -0.661*** -0.671***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
q22 -0.084*** -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.091***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x1 0.398*** 0.367*** 0.351*** 0.384*** 0.368*** 0.329*** 0.401***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x2 0.379*** 0.373*** 0.398*** 0.366*** 0.392*** 0.407*** 0.331***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x3 0.206*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 0.213*** 0.233*** 0.246*** 0.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x12 0.072*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.050*** 0.061***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x22 0.007 0.011 0.017 0.016** 0.016 0.010 0.015*
(0.311) (0.336) (0.217) (0.015) (0.221) (0.364) (0.051)
x32 -0.002 0.048 0.074 -0.017 0.050 0.020 0.003
(0.964) (0.352) (0.153) (0.703) (0.388) (0.690) (0.952)
x1x2 -0.120*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.083***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x1x3 0.043 0.027 0.032* 0.043** 0.039* 0.050** 0.044**
(0.109) (0.171) (0.053) (0.023) (0.054) (0.010) (0.025)
x2x3 0.043** -0.021 -0.026 0.042** -0.007 -0.013 0.012
(0.026) (0.346) (0.247) (0.024) (0.776) (0.545) (0.561)
x1q2 -0.019*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.016*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.010*
(0.001) (0.332) (0.129) (0.000) (0.104) (0.140) (0.054)
x2q2 -0.154*** -0.175*** -0.182*** -0.119*** -0.161*** -0.199*** -0.140***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
x3q2 0.162*** 0.150*** 0.173*** 0.129*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.148***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha tuit 0.502*** 0.522*** 0.180*** 0.463***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha tuit2 0.169*** 0.201*** 0.005 0.175***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.858) (0.000)
bsha pub int -0.125*** -0.089*** -0.050*** -0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bsha pub int2 -0.027** -0.016** -0.012** -0.032***
(0.026) (0.048) (0.022) (0.000)
bsha priv -0.034** 0.017 0.000 0.011
(0.041) (0.324) (0.974) (0.523)
bsha priv2 -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.008* -0.013
(0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.214)
bsha tuit q2 0.056***
(0.000)
bsha tuit x1 -0.055**
(0.014)
bsha tuit x2 -0.008
(0.738)
bsha tuit x3 0.045
(0.104)
bsha pub int q2 -0.050***
(0.000)
bsha pub int x1 -0.010
(0.306)
bsha pub int x2 -0.020*
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(0.077)
bsha pub int x3 -0.022
(0.195)
bsha priv q2 0.035***
(0.000)
bsha priv x1 -0.009
(0.380)
bsha priv x2 -0.008
(0.420)
bsha priv x3 0.042**
(0.017)
Constant -0.153** -0.702*** -0.646*** -0.173*** -0.606*** -0.415*** -0.412***
(0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inefficiency Equation: depvar: σ2u
bsha tuit 1.672*** 2.140*** 0.351 1.765***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.185) (0.000)
bsha tuit2 1.053*** 1.429*** 0.383* 1.172***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000)
bsha pub int -0.669*** -0.935*** -0.082 -0.741***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.214) (0.000)
bsha pub int2 -0.176* -0.227 0.049 -0.304**
(0.076) (0.112) (0.577) (0.011)
bsha priv -0.220** 0.474* -0.151 -0.056
(0.047) (0.066) (0.122) (0.781)
bsha priv2 -0.488*** -0.902*** -0.224*** -0.756***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Constant -1.965*** -2.015*** -1.531*** -2.010*** -1.887*** -1.966*** -1.959***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711 1711
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
p-values of coefficients in parentheses;*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
All estimations refer to a simultaneous two-stage SFA, the first stage, the production function
estimation, and in the second stage with the inefficiency estimation assuming a half-normal distri-
bution with the variance of inefficiency as dependent variable.
Model 1: Including budget share financed by tuition fees in both equations
Model 2: Including budget share financed by public international funds in both equations
Model 3: Including budget share financed by private funds in both equations
Model 4: Including all budget share types in both frontier and inefficiency equation
Model 5: Including all budget share types in the inefficiency equation only
Model 6: Including all budget share types in the frontier equation only
Model 7: Including all budget share types in both equations adding their interactions with x and q.
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